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The Deck-Hand's Story
Itagaki Kō zō  was  an o rphan o f empire. At the end o f the As ia-Pacific War, then aged fifteen, he was  s tranded in the fo rmer Japanese
co lo ny o f Karafuto  (Sakhalin). His  father, a co al miner, had died in a mining accident when Itagaki was  a child, and his  mo ther had
been killed in the brief but fierce fighting that erupted as  So viet fo rces  swept into  the so uthern half o f Sakhalin fo llo wing the
USSR's  declaratio n o f war o n Japan o n 8  Augus t 1945.1 Jus t as  many yo ung men in Japan so ught survival after the surrender by
taking jo bs  with the o ccupying American fo rces , Itagaki survived by beco ming a "ho usebo y" to  a So viet o fficer, and his  emplo yer,
Maxim Tarkin, appears  to  have been co nnected to  the GPU (the fo rerunner o f the KGB). In 1949, Tarkin left fo r Mo sco w via China,
and allo wed Itagaki to  acco mpany him fro m Sakhalin as  far as  Shenyang in no rthern China, fro m where Itagaki ho ped to  be able to
find a way to  the Japanese ho meland he had never seen.2
Fro m Shenyang, Itagaki cro ssed the po ro us  bo rder into  No rth Ko rea,
made his  way alo ne do wn the co as t o f the Ko rean Peninsula as  far
as  the po rt o f Wo nsan, and fo und a berth o n a smuggling bo at go ing
to  Japan. The bo at, jus t o ne o f many tho usands  cro ss ing the seas
surro unding Japan in the immediate po s twar years , entered To kyo
Bay witho ut detectio n, and dro pped Itagaki o ff in the po rt-s ide
dis trict o f Shibaura. But Itagaki Kō zō  had no  jo b, no  ho me and no
immediate family in Japan, so  after a few days  wandering aro und the
capital, he to o k up an o ffer made by o ne o f the smugglers , who  had
to ld him that if he decided no t to  s tay in Japan, he sho uld go  to  the
quays ide o n a certain day, when a seco nd smuggling bo at, the Kōhoku
Maru, wo uld put into  po rt. Itagaki bo arded the Kōhoku Maru, and
wo rked as  a deck hand o n this  smuggling bo at fo r almo s t two  years ,
as  it quietly plied the seas  between Japan and vario us  des tinatio ns
in Okinawa, No rth and So uth Ko rea, China, Taiwan and Far Eas tern
Russ ia.3
It is  very po ss ible that the Kōhoku Maru was  engaged, no t o nly in
illicit trade, but also  in espio nage o r o ther po litical activities , but
Itagaki was  apparently kept in the dark abo ut its  mo re sens itive
miss io ns . In March 1951, the bo at entered a po rt in Niigata
Prefecture o n the wes t co as t o f Japan, and Itagaki was  handed a package wrapped up in a furoshiki which he was  ins tructed to  deliver
uno pened to  an address  near the to wn o f Misawa in no rtheas tern Japan, s ite o f a large US military base. Itagaki bo arded a train fo r
Misawa, but a little way into  the jo urney he was  co nsumed by curio s ity abo ut the co ntents  o f the bundle he was  carrying, and s tarted
to  o pen the furoshiki. Suddenly, he was  seized by ano ther man in the railway carriage, who , unbekno wns t to  Itagaki, had evidently
been emplo yed by the smugglers  to  shado w him. The man grabbed the bundle, pushed Itagaki o ut o f the train at the next s to p, and
beat him severely. Left in an unfamiliar landscape, dazed and witho ut mo ney o r po ssess io ns , Itagaki wandered in co nfus io n alo ng
the s ide o f the railway track until he was  fo und by a guard who  handed him o ver to  the po lice.4
Because he was  s till a juvenile under Japanese law, Itagaki was  sent to  a yo uth detentio n centre. But, as  a returnee fro m Sakhalin
who  had arrived by a mo s t unusual ro ute, he so o n attracted the attentio ns , no t jus t o f the Japanese po lice, but also  o f the US
intelligence services . So  he became o ne o f the hundreds  o f the tho usands  o f Japanese repatriates  who  (as  we saw in the firs t part
o f this  essay) were a majo r US so urce o f info rmatio n o n co mmunis t co untries . Itagaki’s  s to ry pro vides  dis turbing ins ight into  the
experience o f returnees  subject to  inves tigatio n and detentio n, tho ugh it is  unlikely that many o thers  endured quite such a vio lent
and eventful “ho meco ming”.
In tes timo ny that he later gave to  a Japanese parliamentary co mmittee, Itagaki recalled ho w, during his  time in juvenile detentio n in
Niigata, he was  co llected every mo rning by o fficers  o f the US Co unter-Intelligence Co rp (CIC, which o perated under the co mmand o f
Charles  Willo ughby), and taken to  their o ffices  in Niigata fo r ques tio ning. Then, after being tried in a juvenile co urt fo r illegal entry
and given s ix mo nths  pro batio n, Itagaki was  again immediately handed o ver by the Japanese autho rities  to  CIC.5 On 3 May 1951, a
CIC agent to o k him by train to  To kyo ’s  Ueno  Statio n, where he was  placed in the cus to dy o f a Nisei o fficer who se name (Itagaki later
dis co vered) was  William Mitsuda. Itagaki was  driven by car to  a mans io n surro unded by a huge walled garden. Arriving late at night,
he had no  idea what this  place was , but he was  so o n to  learn that it was  the Fo rmer Iwasaki Res idence: headquarters  o f Z Unit.6
Like all tes timo ny surro unding underco ver activities , and like many o fficial do cuments  to o , Itagaki’s  s to ry raises  ques tio ns  o f
veracity and interpretatio n. Even Ino mata Kō zō , the So cialis t Party parliamentarian who  to o k up the cause o f Itagaki and o ther
victims  o f Z Unit, at firs t fo und his  s to ry “jus t to o  weird”, and treated it with a mixture o f belief and incredulity. 7 In a media interview
which he gave in 1953, Itagaki passed o n so me seco nd-hand info rmatio n abo ut the Unit’s  higher co mmand that was  inco rrect (fo r
example, he s tated that Cano n, who  was  a Texan, came fro m Califo rnia).8  But during the parliamentary hearings  o n Z Unit held in
Augus t o f that year, key elements  o f Itagaki’s  perso nal s to ry (including his  acco unt o f interro gatio n in Niigata, trans fer to  the hands
o f CIC, and incarceratio n by Cano n’s  o rganizatio n) were co nfirmed by o ther witnesses : a Niigata public pro secuto r, an o fficial o f the
Minis try o f Jus tice, and fo rmer Cano n emplo yee and whis tleblo wer Yamada Zenjirō .9  Parliamentarian Ino mata came to  believe that,
in speaking o f the things  he had experienced himself, the yo ung returnee had indeed “to ld it the way it was”. 10  Certainly, the
tes timo ny Itagaki gave to  parliament is  full o f circumstantial details  that have the ring o f truth: fo r example, Itagaki recalled that
when he arrived in To kyo  late o n the evening o f 3 May, the car that to o k him to  the Z Unit headquarters  (which is  within easy walking
dis tance o f Ueno  Statio n) was  deliberately driven ro und in circles , presumably to  co nfuse him abo ut his  lo catio n; he realised this
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Iwasaki mansio n garden
because he remembered repeatedly pass ing a large neo n s ign o n
o ne co rner o f the s tatio n advertis ing Mo rinaga Milk Candy.11
On arriving at the Iwasaki mans io n, Itagaki said, he was  lo cked in a
windo wless  cell underneath the main ho use fo r abo ut two  weeks  o f
interro gatio n, during which time he was  deprived o f fo o d and s leep,
fo rced to  s trip, and threatened with knives  and a pis to l by Jack
Cano n and o ther Unit members . It became clear that the American
intelligence autho rities  did no t believe the answers  that Itagaki had
given to  the CIC o fficers  in Niigata, and Z Unit demanded further
info rmatio n abo ut gun-running o r espio nage by the smuggling bo at
Kōhoku Maru.12 But, Itagaki ins is ted, he had no thing mo re to  tell.
After the weeks  o f fear and darkness  in the Iwasaki mans io n
basement, he was  trans ferred to  ano ther Z Unit pro perty kno wn as
the TC Ho use o r Tō sen Club: a building in Kawasaki which had o nce
belo nged to  the Bank o f To kyo .13
Yamada Zenjirō , who  had been emplo yed as  a co o k by Jack Cano n
and his  wife at their ho use near Yo ko hama and then trans ferred by
Cano n to  wo rk at the TC Ho use, describes  this  building as  being
shaped like a cro ss , o ne arm o f which had been subdivided to  create
s ix small cells , ranged o n either s ide o f a co rrido r. It was  here that Z
Unit acco mmo dated so me o f its  “gues ts ”, as  the secret detainees
were called. Itagaki was  bro ught to  the TC Ho use late o ne night in
the early summer o f 1951, and was  placed in a cell where his  hands
and legs  were shackled to  an army camp bed with handcuffs .14
Yamada was  required to  prepare fo o d fo r several “gues ts ” at the TC
Ho use, and recalls  that Itagaki had been preceded by a Ko rean
priso ner kno wn to  Z Unit s taff by the pseudo nym “Ko bayashi Hideo ”,
who  was  later taken away to  an unkno wn des tinatio n after suffering
a mental breakdo wn in cus to dy.15 The left-wing writer Kaji Wataru,
who  was  kidnapped near his  ho me by Z Unit agents  in No vember
1951, was  also  impriso ned in a cell in the TC Ho use after being
interro gated at the Iwasaki mans io n. While there, Kaji attempted
suicide: an act that wo uld ultimately lead to  public revelatio ns  abo ut
so me o f Z Unit’s  activities  in Japan.16
After being held at the TC Ho use fo r abo ut two  mo nths , Itagaki was  driven back to  the Iwasaki mans io n aro und eleven o ne evening,
and taken s traight to  Jack Cano n’s  large o ffice o n the upper flo o r o f the building, where he was  threatened with immediate executio n
if he failed to  pro vide mo re info rmatio n o n the activities  o f the Kōhoku Maru. Unable to  satis fy his  capto r's  demands , Itagaki was
then taken o ut into  the garden where he s to o d in the night driz z le waiting fo r Cano n and a Nisei deputy to  carry o ut the executio n.
But in the end, Cano n seems  to  have been persuaded that his  priso ner indeed had no thing mo re to  tell him, so  ins tead o f being
sho t, Itagaki was  ins tead required to  s ign up fo r service with Z Unit, who  supplied him with a Niho n Univers ity s tudent’s  unifo rm and
gave him perfuncto ry training in underco ver surveillance techniques . So o n, tho ugh, Itagaki was  reass igned to  a mo re familiar task:
in December 1951, he was  sent to  wo rk as  a deck-hand o n o ne o f several smuggling ships  o perated by Z Unit with the acquiescence
o f the Japanese maritime and po lice autho rities .17 His  vessel mainly plied the waters  between To kyo  and Busan in So uth Ko rea,
carrying cargo  which was  pro bably used partly to  raise untraceable finances  fo r Z Unit o peratio ns . Acco rding to  Itagaki, this  included
crates  labeled “Kao  So ap” but, he added, “I am a bit do ubtful whether they really co ntained so ap”.18
There was  also  human cargo . On o ne o ccas io n, Itagaki recalled, his  ship carried a Ko rean man, wo man and small child fro m Busan to
To kyo . So o n after, he heard that a wo man had been taken into  the Iwasaki mans io n cells  fo r interro gatio n, and fro m the descriptio n
co ncluded that this  was  the wo man they had bro ught o ver fro m Ko rea. On the next vo yage, they transpo rted five peo ple including a
man who  had apparently been taken priso ner o f war in Wo nsan and who  was  put o n bo ard the bo at in handcuffs .19
Itagaki’s  intriguing tes timo ny, given at co ns iderable length to  the co mmittee hearings , leaves  many ques tio ns  s till to  be answered;
but (as  parliamentarian Ino mata later lamented) there was  to  be no  o ppo rtunity to  pursue the answers  further. After leaving Z Unit
and speaking publicly abo ut his  experiences , Itagaki had appealed to  the Human Rights  Pro tectio n Sectio n o f Japan’s  Jus tice Minis try
fo r help, fearing reprisals  fro m Z Unit o peratives  s till wo rking in Japan. But, s ince he was  bo rn in the co lo nial empire and had
entered Japan by illegal means , even his  Japanese natio nality was  in do ubt, and the Jus tice Minis try’s  respo nse was  that he sho uld
wait until there was  a tangible threat to  his  safety, and then go  to  the po lice.20  Very so o n after giving his  tes timo ny in parliament,
Itagaki Kō zō  disappeared. There is  no  way o f determining his  fate, but Yamada Zenjirō , who  las t saw the then 23-year-o ld Itagaki at
the parliamentary hearing o n 5 Augus t 1953, says  “my gut feeling is  that he was  do ne away with [kesareta]”.21
Very Special Renditions: Z Unit, POWs and Korean War Espionage
The bo at o n which Itagaki Kō zō  wo rked was  jus t part o f a co mplex web o f invis ible transpo rts  linking Z Unit and o ther American and
Japanese intelligence o peratio ns  to  Ko rea, China and beyo nd. The Unit appears  to  have o perated a small f leet o f s imilar bo ats
invo lved in smuggling and espio nage, which (acco rding to  info rmatio n that Yamada Zenjirō  heard fro m o ther Japanese Z Unit
emplo yees) was  co ntro lled fro m an o ffice in the Yo ko hama branch o f an American trading co mpany. 22 Cano n’s  o peratives  also  had
access  to  US military aircraft fo r its  cro ss -bo rder o peratio ns . The Unit’s  seco nd-in-co mmand Yeo n Jeo n wo uld (fo r example) later
describe an espio nage miss io n spanning Japan, So uth Ko rea and China, co nducted by the Unit in July 1950. In a desperate attempt
to  o btain info rmatio n abo ut China’s  military intentio ns  in the Ko rean War, Z Unit o peratives  in Japan recruited three Chinese and ten
Ko reans  who  had lived fo r extended perio ds  in Manchuria, and flew them to  So uth Ko rea fro m the US Tachikawa Airbase o n the
o utskirts  o f To kyo . In Ko rea they were trained alo ngs ide members  o f the Ko rean No rthwes t Yo uth Brigade, a widely-feared gro up
made up mo s tly o f yo ung and fero cio us ly antico mmunis t men who  had fled so uth fro m No rth Ko rea, and became particularly
no to rio us  fo r their ro le in massacres  o n Jeju Is land fo llo wing the 1948  Jeju upris ing. This  multinatio nal brigade was  then divided
into  three gro ups , and parachuted into  China to  gather intelligence.23 Charles  Willo ughby to o , in a lo ng interview which he gave to
Yeo n Jeo n and Japanese his to rian Hiratsuka Masao  in the 1970s , recalled the dispatch o f Chinese spies  fro m Japan o n espio nage
miss io ns  behind the Ko rean War lines .24 But there is  o ne impo rtant detail which neither man mentio ned: no t all the Chinese trained
as  Ko rean War spies  in Japan were willing and witting vo lunteers .
So me mo nths  after Itagaki Kō zō ’s  departure fro m the TC Ho use, mo ck executio n and enro lment into  Z Unit, Yamada Zenjirō  and
POW camp o n Ko je Island
Chinese POW t at t o ed by his capt o rs
ano ther Japanese emplo yee o f Z Unit were summo ned to  the Iwasaki mans io n. Fro m there, under the directio n o f a Nisei o fficer
named Itō , they were taken in a co nvo y o f three trucks  laden with beds  and mattresses  to  a brick building, kno wn to  the US
o ccupatio n fo rces  as  “US-740”, in the Shibuya dis trict o f To kyo . The next day, two  Chinese-speaking US o fficers  arrived at the
building, and Itō  warned Yamada and his  Japanese co lleague o f dire co nsequences  if they ever spo ke abo ut the things  they were
go ing to  witness . The reaso n fo r these preparatio ns  became clear later that night, when American military vehicles  arrived at the
do o r o f US-740  carrying aro und twenty Chinese passengers . As  Yamada so o n realised, these new “gues ts ” were Chinese priso ners
o f war who  had been secretly transpo rted to  Japan fro m Geo je-Do  priso ner o f war camp in Ko rea. Many had anti-co mmunis t s lo gans
tatto o ed o n their bo dies .25
Geo je-Do , the larges t priso ner o f war camp run by UN fo rces  in Ko rea, o ccupied a large part o f an is land so uth o f the po rt city o f
Busan. By the middle o f 1951, it had gro wn to  beco me the s ize o f a small city itself, co ntaining o ver 150 ,000  POWs ho used in
tented co mpo unds  sprawled acro ss  the hill s lo pes  o f the is land. Co nditio ns  were o vercro wded, there were water sho rtages  and
epidemics  o f dysentery.26  Under the Geneva Co nventio ns , priso ners  o f war had the right to  o rganize their o wn hierarchy o f co ntro l
within the camps , but in a s ituatio n where (in essence) two  civil wars  – o ne Ko rean and o ne Chinese – were being fo ught o ut within
the bo unds  o f the camp, this  had unfo reseen co nsequences .
No t lo ng after Geo je-Do  camp was  es tablished, co nflicts  between
pro -co mmunis t and anti-co mmunis t priso ners  erupted into  vio lence:
there were nighttime beatings  and lynchings , with So uth Ko rean
guards  no t infrequently lending their suppo rt to  the anti-co mmunis t
s ide. Many priso ners  were tatto o ed with po litical s lo gans , in an
effo rt to  enfo rce their adherence to  o ne s ide o f the co nflict o r
ano ther. By September 1951, twenty priso ners  o f war in Geo je-Do
and nearby Busan camps  had been (in the wo rds  o f a Red Cro ss
repo rt) “beaten to  death by perso ns  unkno wn”, and by the middle o f
1952, at leas t 125 POWs had been killed in clashes  with Ko rean o r
US guards .27 No t surpris ingly, many priso ners  were desperate to
leave Geo je-Do ; and when so me Chinese POWs who  had expressed
s tro ng anti-co mmunis t views  were o ffered the o ppo rtunity o f wo rk
o uts ide the camp under the co mmand o f the US army, they readily
accepted the o ffer. It seems  that few if any realised, until it was  to o
late to  change their minds , that the wo rk being o ffered was
participatio n in spying miss io ns  in No rth Ko rea and China, where the
chances  o f capture and death were extremely high.28
The
co ntingents  o f POW co nscripts  were divided into  two  s treams, o ne o f which was  trained o n the is land o f So ngap-Do  near Incheo n in
So uth Ko rea, while the o ther was  sent to  To kyo . Yamada Zenjirō  recalls  that further gro ups  o f Chinese POWs were acco mmo dated in
the TC Ho use, where they were given training by s taff who  included o ne So uth Ko rean and two  Natio nalis t Chinese o fficers , and
where the anti-co mmunis t s lo gans  o n their bo dies  were co ncealed under a new layer o f tatto o s .29  The training pro gram seems  to
have been a secret even within the US military, fo r, rather than o btaining supplies  fro m regular army so urces , the o fficers  in charge
o f the pro gram o rdered Yamada to  buy fo o d fo r the priso ners  fro m Japanese gro cery s to res  (at the same time reques ting him to
pro vide them with receipts  o n which the sums  expended sho uld be “padded” [mizumashi sareta]).30  The secrecy which s till surro unds
the pro gram to day was , o f co urse, necess itated no t jus t by the inherently secret nature o f spy miss io ns , but also  by the fact that
this  use o f priso ners  o f war was  a very serio us  vio latio n o f the Geneva Co nventio ns .
Yamada’s  co mmunicatio n with the Chinese POWs was  limited, tho ugh o ne man fro m Shanxi Pro vince co uld speak so me wo rds  o f
military Japanese that he had been required to  learn during the war; and during the priso ners ’ s tay in To kyo , Yamada perfected the
art o f co o king jiaozi gyōza], whi c h the p r i s o ners  enjo yed .
31 Des p i te the s ec rec y, tho ug h, Yamad a c o uld  haz ard  a g ues s  at the nature o f the tra i ni ng  tak i ng
p l ac e, b ec aus e l arg e war time map s  o f Manc hur i a were p i nned  up  o n the wal l s  o f the TC  Ho us e, and  the p r i s o ners  c o nd uc ted  exerc i s es  o n a hi g h to wer
c o ns truc ted  i n the g ard en b ehind  the ho us e. Yamad a, who  had  p er fo rmed  s imi l ar  exerc i s es  d ur i ng  hi s  time as  a s tud ent rec rui t to  the Jap anes e armed
fo rc es , rec o g ni s ed  thes e as  a p r imi ti ve fo rm o f p arac hute tra i ni ng .32 After  fur ther  tra i ni ng  at a US  mi l i tary b as e i n Jap an, the p r i s o ner -s p i es  were d ro p p ed
o n thei r  mi s s i o ns  b ehind  the l i nes  i n No r th Ko rea and  China. O nl y a s mal l  fr ac ti o n o f them s urvi ved  the Ko rean War .33
Invisible Trade: Smuggling Networks, Espionage and Japan’s Transwar Regime
Occupied Japan was  a s taging po s t fo r o verseas  espio nage miss io ns  co nducted by Japanese as  well as  by Americans , Chinese and
Ko reans , and these miss io ns  were integrally intertwined with the co mplex webs  o f smuggling that cro ssed the seas  o f the regio n in
the years  immediately after the end o f the As ia-Pacific War. The sudden co llapse o f the Japanese empire had severed trading and
migratio n netwo rks  built up o ver decades  thro ugho ut Eas t As ia. Impelled by fears  o f subvers io n, as  early as  1946  the Occupatio n
autho rities  had impo sed tight co ntro ls  o n the mo vement o f go o ds  and peo ple acro ss  the seas  between Japan and its  neighbo urs ,
China, Taiwan and Ko rea. Even mo vement between Japan and Okinawa (at that time separated fro m the res t o f the co untry under US
military rule) was  s trictly regulated. Sheer necess ity, tho ugh, meant that bo ats  co ntinued to  cro ss  the newly-drawn dividing lines
witho ut o fficial autho rizatio n, carrying urgently needed raw materials  and co mmo dities , displaced peo ple mo ving between Japan and
its  fo rmer co lo nies , and so metimes  mo re dangero us  cargo es  such as  weapo ns  and drugs .34
But the autho rities  who  co ntro lled this  clandes tine traffic also  used it fo r their o wn aims . In the early 1980s , a Japanese magaz ine
published quite detailed perso nal interviews  with Japanese peo ple who  claimed to  have been invo lved in spying miss io ns  to  No rth
Ko rea, o rganized by Z Unit as  well as  engaging in the smuggling o f go o ds  and peo ple and o ther clandes tine activities .35 Altho ugh
these s to ries  are diff icult to  verify, we do  kno w that serio us  plans  fo r espio nage co upled with smuggling were drawn up by leading
ex-members  o f the Japanese imperial military in co nsultatio n with US intelligence.
As  we saw in part o ne o f this  essay, the 1948-1949  Takematsu Plan invo lved an impo rtant o verseas  espio nage element, which was
supervized and paid fo r by US G2 s taff, but co nducted by Japanese under the o peratio nal co ntro l o f the fo rmer Deputy Chief o f Staff
o f the Imperial Army, Kawabe To rashirō . Acco rding to  repo rts  fro m a so urce described by US intelligence as  “highly reliable”, the
o riginal vers io n o f the Take (fo reign intelligence) plan targeted No rth Ko rea, China and the So viet Unio n. As  initially envisaged, it
was  to  have invo lved a firs t-ins talment trans fer o f o ne millio n yen via Kawabe to  a trader in Yamaguchi Prefecture to  es tablish
smuggling miss io ns  to  So uth Ko rea. These miss io ns  wo uld then be used to  ferry Japanese agents , who  wo uld cro ss  the 38 th
Parallel into  No rth Ko rea and Manchuria. There were also  s chemes  fo r an espio nage base o n the is land o f Tsushima.36
In Ho kkaido , where the Take pro ject was  placed under the co ntro l o f Arisue Senzaburō , bro ther o f Imperial Army wartime intelligence
chief Arisue Seizō , the schedule o f tasks  fo r the firs t phases  o f espio nage agains t the USSR ran as  fo llo ws: “co ntact reliable
Japanese in Karafuto ; send repatriates  back into  the target area as  agents ; es tablish smuggling with the target area us ing fo untain
pens  and watches  as  bartering material; dispatch fishermen into  the area; purpo sely shipwreck sailo rs  in the target area; patro l the
adjacent waters  with speed bo ats ; utilize radio  intercept fo r intelligence purpo ses .”37
Ultimately, the Takematsu Plan was  scaled back, and the pro po sals  fo r spy miss io ns  into  No rth Ko rea and China via So uth Ko rea
were abando ned. One reaso n was  gro wing co ncern within Occupatio n intelligence circles  abo ut the co s t and value o f the pro ject;
ano ther may have been the o bvio us  po litical sens itivities . So uth Ko rean autho rities  might well have had mixed feelings  abo ut
reques ts  to  turn a blind eye to  a spy miss io n run by fo rmer senio r Japanese Imperial Army o fficers  and us ing their territo ry as  a
s taging po s t. But parts  o f the Ho kkaido -based miss io n agains t the So viet Unio n seem to  have go ne ahead as  planned. In December
1948, G2’s  Co l. Arthur L. Lacey info rmed the Japanese leaders  o f the Takematsu gro up that “a 1940, black, fo ur do o r sedan, Engine
No . 1875283528 wo uld be made available to  Kawabe” fo r his  Takematsu duties , and typewriters  were also  supplied to  his  team. By
the end o f 1948 , Kawabe was  able to  anno unce that “a repo rt o n ‘Present Co nditio ns  in Karafuto ’ has  been submitted to  Take in
Ho kkaido  and is  pending trans latio n”, and in May 1949  a bo at fo r the Take miss io ns  in Ho kkaido  had been pro cured and was
“pro bably co ntro lled by Arisue Senzaburō  in Abashiri.”38
There are also  repeated repo rts  in the declass ified CIA files  that espio nage miss io ns  to  No rth Ko rea and No rtheas tern China were
being carried o ut by Arisue Seizō ’s  clo se asso ciate, fo rmer Majo r General Watanabe Wataru. Watanabe’s  Mitsubo shi Trading
Co mpany was  s taffed by so me o f his  military asso ciates , including “vario us  Army TMKK [Tokumu Kikan – Special Operatio ns ] and Air
Fo rce Officers ”, and by 1948-1949  it had begun “illegal trading o peratio ns  with Ko rea, Fo rmo sa and No rth China”. 39  At the height o f
the Ko rean War in No vember 1950, so urces  who m US intelligence ranked as  “usually reliable” repo rted that Watanabe and Arisue had
a plan to  seek US suppo rt fo r “o peratio ns  into  Manchuria invo lving the use o f Ko reans  selected fro m the fo rmer Ko rean Res idents
League o f Japan [Chōsenjin Renmei, disbanded in 1949] who  are actually anti-Co mmunis t”.40  Info rmatio n fro m ano ther “usually
reliable” so urce in September 1950  repo rted that “Co lo nel Tsuji Masano bu…. is  no w planned to  serve as  o ne o f Watanabe Wataru’s
ass is tants  in future o peratio ns  into  No rth Ko rea”.41 The CIA’s  1951 repo rt o n Japanese intelligence agencies  also  no tes  that
Watanabe had co ntact with G2’s  Co unterintelligence Co rps  as  a “market fo r his  info rmatio n”, but that “the quality o f his  o verseas
info rmatio n is  no  lo nger believed to  be very go o d”.42
But it is  the relatio nship between Japanese fo rmer military o fficers , US intelligence and the Chinese Natio nalis t Go vernment o n
Taiwan that mo s t vividly illus trates  the co mplex nexus  o f transwar and transbo rder intelligence gathering in early Co ld War Eas t As ia.
The Taiwan Connection: Tatsumi Eiichi and the Japan – US – Nationalist China Triangle
In 1945, as  the Japanese o ffens ive in China crumbled, and the smo uldering Chinese civil war flared up again, Chinese natio nalis t
fo rces  in vario us  parts  o f the co untry had begun to  recruit the services  o f defeated Japanese fo rces  in their s truggle agains t
co mmunism. The co mmunis t s ide o f the co nflict was  so o n to  fo llo w suit: subs tantial numbers  o f Japanese s tragglers  in China
wo uld ultimately be enro lled into  the Chinese Peo ple’s  Army, and a small number even served with the Chinese Peo ple’s  Vo lunteers
o n the no rthern s ide in the Ko rean War.43 Acco rding to  detailed info rmatio n co ntained in the declass ified CIA files , o ne o f the
Japanese who se services  were mo bilized by the Chinese natio nalis t go vernment was  Tatsumi Eiichi (1895-1988).
Tatsumi had been Japanese Military Attache in Lo ndo n befo re the war, serving with and beco ming a clo se friend o f the then
Ambassado r Yo shida Shigeru, and at the time o f Japan’s  defeat he co mmanded the Imperial Army’s  3rd Divis io n, based in Shanghai.
In return fo r ass is ting the Chiang Kai-shek go vernment with intelligence o peratio ns  agains t the co mmunis ts , Tatsumi was  spared the
experience o f beco ming a priso ner o f war. Ins tead, he was  put to  wo rk in Shanghai o n anti-co mmunis t info rmatio n gathering
activities  alo ngs ide ano ther fo rmer senio r Japanese army o fficer, Do i Akio  (1896-1976), who  had been Ass is tant Chief o f Staff to
the Kwantung Army.
In June 1946, the Chinese Natio nalis ts  agreed to  send Tatsumi ho me to  Japan, the quid pro  quo  being an arrangement whereby he
was  to  wo rk as  an intelligence o rganizer fo r the newly-es tablished Natio nalis t Chinese Miss io n in To kyo ; Do i remained in China.
Tatsumi succeeded in recruiting so me o f his  fo rmer Japanese military intelligence co lleagues  to  wo rk fo r the Chinese Natio nalis t
cause in Japan, but his  heart do es  no t seem to  have been in the jo b. He had evidently taken the po s itio n with the Chinese Miss io n
mainly because it allo wed him to  return to  Japan, and by late 1947, he was  lo o king fo r o ther emplo yment. At this  po int, his  o ld friend
Yo shida Shigeru intro duced him to  General Charles  Willo ughby, who  secured his  enro lment into  the ranks  o f Kawabe To rashirō ’s
Kawabe Kikan.44 Fro m then o n, as  o ne 1953 US do cument no tes , Tatsumi “rendered excellent service in the o rganizatio n and
o peratio n o f Japanese effo rts  o n behalf o f American intelligence”.45
After Yo shida returned to  po wer in Octo ber 1948, Tatsumi became the prime minis ter's  perso nal adviso r o n military matters , in which
ro le he was  respo ns ible fo r s creening so me 400  fo rmer imperial army o fficers  who  were recruited into  the ranks  o f the Natio nal
Po lice Reserve, the pro to -military fo rce fo rmed in Augus t 1950  in respo nse to  the o utbreak o f the Ko rean War. During the Yo shida
adminis tratio n, Tatsumi is  described as  dividing his  time equally between his  wo rk fo r Yo shida and his  wo rk fo r Kawabe’s  clandes tine
intelligence o rganizatio n: “No rmally Tatsumi devo tes  his  mo rnings  to  the Kawabe Organizatio n and his  afterno o ns  to  the po lice
reserve and o ther go vernment matters . He has  an o ffice in so me go vernment building, exact lo catio n unkno wn. His  two  po s itio ns
pay him well eno ugh that he appears  to  be co mfo rtably o ff f inancially”.46  His  relatio nships  with Yo shida and Willo ughby enabled him
to  help secure the return to  Japan o f Do i Akio , who  was  also  put to  wo rk by Willo ughby and Kawabe, heading an intelligence
gathering o rganizatio n kno wn as  the Co ntinental Affairs  Research Ins titute [Tairiku Mondai Kenkyujo], to  which Tatsumi was  an adviso r
– tho ugh the intimate co nnectio n between the Kawabe Kikan and the Research Ins titute was  a “secret clo sely guarded o n o rders  o f
G-2”.47
Tatsumi Eiichi was  able to  maintain his  clo se co ntacts  with Chinese Natio nalis t intelligence while also  helping to  build Japan’s
po s twar intelligence o rganizatio n and co ntinuing his  “excellent service” to  G2, the CIA and o ther US intelligence o rganizatio ns . As
we saw in part o ne o f this  essay, he helped to  vet fo rmer military o fficers  who  were recruited to  advise the Cabinet Research
Chamber, the Japanese intelligence gathering bo dy set up by Prime Minis ter Yo shida and his  Chief Cabinet Secretary Ogata Taketo ra.
In 1953, Tatsumi also  repo rtedly helped to  create a special fo ur-perso n team within the Chamber to  “co llect info rmatio n fro m
repatriates  fro m Co mmunis t China”: info rmatio n that was , o f co urse, so o n to  be shared with the US State Department under the
“to p secret plan fo r the explo itatio n o f repatriates ”.48
By Augus t 1956 , US intelligence services  had plans  to  “use Tatsumi as  an ‘adviso r’ in o ur es tablishment o f intelligence liaiso n with
the SDA [Japanese Self-Defence Agency]”, and perhaps  fo r that reaso n, pro ceedings  were s tarted within the CIA to  have Tatsumi
(who  was  kno wn by the co de name POLESTAR-5) fo rmally appro ved as  a co ntact o f the Agency. 49  This  fo rmal relatio nship seems  to
have been relatively sho rt-lived: in Augus t o f the fo llo wing year direct co ntacts  between the CIA and POLESTAR-5 ceased with the
departure o f so me key Japanese, US o r Natio nalis t Chinese o fficial who se name remains  censo red in the files .50  But the co mplex
triangular relatio nship between Japan, Natio nalis t China and the US created by peo ple like Tatsumi helped to  set the scene fo r a
wide range o f co vert cro ss -bo rder activities , linking Japan no t o nly to  Taiwan but also  to  places  further afield.
The Southern Expeditions: From Taiwan to Indochina
In the seco nd half o f 1949 , newspapers  in Japan and aro und the wo rld published repo rts  that Nemo to  Hiro shi, the fo rmer
co mmander o f the Imperial Japanese military fo rces  in no rth China, had been smuggled into  Taiwan where he was  helping the
Natio nalis t Chinese go vernment to  recruit ex-members  o f the Japanese military as  vo lunteers  fo r the war with the co mmunis ts .51
The repo rts  created so mething o f a sensatio n. After all, Japan had been disarmed, leading figures  in its  military were suppo sed to
have been purged, and Japan no w had a co ns titutio n pledging it to  the renunciatio n o f war. A Natio nalis t Chinese go vernment
diplo mat in To kyo  denied that his  go vernment was  recruiting Japanese, but ackno wledged that Nemo to  had apparently smuggled
himself into  Taiwan in the middle o f the year.52
In the wake o f the allegatio ns , a junio r member o f a smuggling gro up run by the fo rmer wartime intelligence o fficer Kawaguchi
Tadaatsu was  arres ted, and admitted invo lvement in the smuggling trip to  Taiwan, but claimed that he was  in the dark abo ut its
po litical dimens io ns .53 Ques tio ns  in the Japanese parliament abo ut the event pro duced o nly brief and co nfus ing info rmatio n. The
head o f the Atto rney General’s  Special Inves tigatio ns  Bureau, ques tio ned in 1951 abo ut Nemo to ’s  secret recruitment trips  to
Taiwan, said “in relatio n to  that plan, even to day there are all so rts  o f rumo urs  flying aro und abo ut repeated smuggling vo yages , but
as  far as  o ur inves tigatio ns  can determine there was  o nly o ne trip”. He was , tho ugh, unable to  pro vide any info rmatio n as  to  the
nature o f that trip o r when it had o ccurred.54 So o n, the mo mentary sensatio n faded, and the incident was  largely fo rgo tten.55
But several o f the fo rmer military o fficers  invo lved in the “So uthern Expeditio ns ”, as  they were called, were funneling info rmatio n to
US intelligence services , and fro m this  we kno w that the vo yage to  Taiwan in the summer o f 1949  was  jus t part o f a series ; there
had apparently been at leas t a co uple o f earlier jo urneys , and there were mo re to  co me. We kno w, to o , that the expeditio ns  invo lved
quite an impress ive line-up o f fo rmer Japanese Imperial military and intelligence o fficers , many o f who m were also  co o perating with
US intelligence. Mo s t members  o f the gro up seem to  have shared a relatio nship with the elderly Ugaki Kazushige (1868-1956), a
fo rmer Go verno r-General o f Ko rea who  was  to  make a brief return as  a co nservative po litician in the mid-1950s . The co re
participants  included no t o nly Nemo to  Hiro shi but also  fo rmer wartime intelligence chief and Willo ughby pro tege Arisue Seizō ,
wartime China intelligence o fficer Kawaguchi Tadaatsu, and fo rmer rear-admiral Maeda Mino ru. Mo re peripheral asso ciates  o f the
gro up included fo rmer military s trategis t Tsuji Masano bu, who  was  elected to  parliament in 1952 as  a member o f Hato yama Ichirō ’s
Demo cratic Party, and Ho riuchi Tateki, a senio r Fo reign Minis try o fficial who  had right-wing leanings  and go o d co ntacts  with the
Chinese Natio nalis t autho rities .56  Like o ther underco ver miss io ns  o f the era, the expeditio ns  to  Taiwan served a dual purpo se: in
this  case, o n the o ne hand, liais ing with the Chinese Natio nalis ts  and pro viding Japanese vo lunteers  fo r their cause; and o n the
o ther, rais ing revenue to  fund future enterprises .
The co ntentio us  Augus t 1949  expeditio n seems  largely to  have been o rganized by Kawaguchi Tadaatsu, and info rmatio n abo ut this
expeditio n leaked o ut to  the media partly because an emplo yee o f Kawaguchi’s  Peace Trus t Credit co mpany (o ne o f the enterprises
thro ugh which he ran his  smuggling and intelligence gathering o peratio ns ) gave an “o vert recruiting speech to  yo uths  in the vicinity
o f Kyo to ” to  enco urage them to  vo lunteer fo r military service with Chinese Natio nalis t fo rces .57 Fo llo wing the embarrass ing publicity
which surro unded this  expeditio n, Kawaguchi’s  o rganizatio n was  persuaded to  merge with Arisue’s  fo r the purpo ses  o f running future
miss io ns , and new recruits  were also  bro ught into  the gro up, including a fo rmer military o fficer named Kimura, “who se chief task it
was  to  ‘f ix’ the Maritime Safety Bureau, the Bo ard o f Trade and o ther Japanese go vernment agencies  with bribes  fro m the pro fits ”.58
In June 1950, a further expeditio n to  Taiwan was  run under the directio n o f Arisue, no t o nly taking Nemo to  to  Taiwan fo r
co nsultatio ns  with the Natio nalis t go vernment but also  succeeding in “bringing back 6 ,000 ,000  yen wo rth o f bananas  which were
put o n sale in the To kyo  markets ”. 59  Smuggling bo th financed many o f their intelligence o peratio ns  and allo wed many o peratives  to
pro fit. In Augus t o f the same year, meetings  to  plan the next majo r expeditio n were underway. Acco rding to  a fo rmer Japanese
military o fficer who  attended o ne o f these meetings  and passed a repo rt to  US intelligence, a fleet o f twelve ships  was  being
assembled to  leave fo r Taiwan fro m Shimo da. The ships  wo uld be paid fo r by the Chinese Natio nalis t go vernment, and were to  have
“Japanese Bo ard o f Trade papers  permitting entry to  Fo rmo san waters  fo r purpo ses  o f legitimate trade”. They wo uld carry a cargo  o f
tea fro m Japan, and were expected to  carry bananas  and sugar o n the return vo yage fro m Taiwan; but they wo uld also  carry Nemo to
Hiro shi and a co ntingent o f Japanese military vo lunteers .6 0
The main aim o f this  and o ther miss io ns  to  Taiwan appears  to  have been to  pro vide Japanese with a range o f skills  who  co uld be
used either as  military trainers  and advisers  in Taiwan intself, o r directly in Natio nalis t Chinese military miss io ns  agains t the
mainland. So me o f tho se invo lved in the So uthern Expeditio ns , such as  Maeda Mino ru, were also  engaged in co llabo rative
intelligence gathering activites  with the Natio nalis t Chinese autho rities .6 1 Perhaps  because o f the o ngo ing reverberatio ns  fro m the
widely publicized 1949  venture, the expeditio n failed to  set o ff in Augus t, and was  ins tead rescheduled to  late Octo ber 1950, when
its  cargo es  were expected to  include “no t o nly co as tal patro l o fficers , army specialis ts  and intelligence o fficers  fo r Fo rmo sa, but
also  po litical intelligence o fficers  numbering abo ut twenty, who  will be sent to  Indo china”; fo r the particularly interes ting feature o f
this  vo yage was  that it extended the reach o f the So uthern Expeditio ns  beyo nd Taiwan to  So utheas t As ia (a part o f the jo urney that
was  to  be carried o ut witho ut o fficial do cumentatio n).6 2
The Indo chinese dimens io ns  o f these underco ver activities , like their Taiwanese dimens io ns , were a direct legacy o f the As ia-Pacific
War. After the end o f the war, large numbers  o f Japanese tro o ps  remained in So utheas t As ia, and so me, rather than return, went into
hiding o r jo ined So utheas t As ian gro ups  fighting fo r independence agains t the returning Euro pean co lo nizers . Meanwhile, Chinese
Natio nalis t fo rces , having been driven back to  the so uthern bo rderlands  o f China, were co ntinuing the s truggle agains t the Chinese
co mmunis ts  fro m neighbo uring co untries  like Burma, and there is  evidence that so me fo rmer members  o f the Japanese armed
fo rces  jo ined them there.6 3
Amo ng the Japanese who  had disappeared in So utheas t As ia fo llo wing Japan’s  defeat was  Tsuji Masano bu (1902-?), who  was
s tatio ned in Thailand in a senio r army po s itio n at the end o f the war, and feared pro secutio n as  a war criminal. Tsuji remained
invis ible until 1950 , when he resurfaced in To kyo  and was  so o n taken o n by Willo ughby via Arisue to  perfo rm intelligence wo rk fo r
the US o ccupiers . But Tsuji was  a co mplex character, who se views  (unlike Arisue’s ) caused co ntinual dis co mfo rt to  his  US
emplo yers . Tho ugh pass io nately anti-co mmunis t, Tsuji was  also  quite anti-American, and argued that Japan sho uld regain its  po wer
as  a natio n with equal ties  to  the eas tern and wes tern camps  in the Co ld War. Tsuji Masano bu appears  to  have retained so me
co ntacts  to  Japanese s tragglers  in So utheas t As ia, and in 1950, was  the perso n initially cho sen by the o rganizers  o f the So uthern
Expeditio ns  to  develo p the planned Indo chinese s ide o f the o peratio n.
But, like so  many underco ver o peratio ns , this  clandes tine venture was  riddled with factio nalism and perso nal infighting. Many
participants  dis liked bo th Arisue and Tsuji, while relatio ns  between these two  men themselves  were beco ming increas ingly s trained.
There were also  pers is tent rumo rs  that Tsuji had been invo lved in war crimes , particularly in a massacre o f Chinese civilians  in
wartime Singapo re6 4, and his  pas t was  therefo re seen as  a po tential liability. In the face o f o bjectio ns  fro m many o f the key figures
in the venture, Tsuji was  replaced as  Indo china o rganizer by To mita Bunichi, fo rmer head o f the Special Military Po lice [ Tokkō
Kenpeitai] in Shanghai (who se wartime pas t, we can o nly surmise, was  less  well-kno wn in So utheas t As ia).6 5 In June 1950, To mita
travelled to  Taiwan in the expeditio n o rganized by Arisue Seizō  fo r co nsultatio ns  with the Natio nalis t Chinese, and by No vember
1950  he was  said to  have “already been dispatched to  Indo china thro ugh the go o d services  o f Nemo to  Hiro shi”. There were also
rumo urs  that “eighteen to  twenty [Japanese] o peratives  s cheduled fo r intelligence o peratio ns  in Indo -China” had go ne with him.6 6
The s trategy was  to  link up with Japanese s tragglers  who  had jo ined the Vietminh fo rces  after Japan’s  defeat, and also  with Chinese
Natio nalis t fo rces  o perating o n the so uthern bo rder o f China.6 7 The main aim invo lved “playing bo th s ides  o f the s truggle” in
Indo china fo r intelligence purpo ses , with the info rmatio n gathered being channeled back to  Japan via Nemo to  in Taiwan.6 8  Since
Arisue retained general lo gis tical co ntro l o f the o peratio n, it is  very likely that info rmatio n fro m the expeditio n was  also  passed o n
to  US intelligence.
Legacies of the Transwar Regime
The o utco me o f the So uthern Expeditio ns  is  unkno wn, and it is  unclear ho w lo ng they co ntinued. But so me implicatio ns  o f these and
s imilar ventures  are clear fro m the declass ified reco rd. Within less  than five years  o f its  defeat, a suppo sedly disarmed and
demo cratized Japan was  again engaged in clandes tine o peratio ns  in vario us  parts  o f its  lo s t empire. Many o f these o peratio ns  were
co nducted o n a quas i-private and very pro fitable bas is  by key fo rmer members  o f the wartime military, intelligence services  and
secret po lice, with the acquiescence o f at leas t sectio ns  o f the Japanese go vernment and o f the intelligence fo rces  o f the United
States . They set the scene fo r intelligence relatio nships  and po litical po wer dynamics  that wo uld co ntinue to  affect Japan lo ng after
it regained its  independence.
Traces  o f these o ngo ing relatio nships  and dynamics  remain in the reco rd. We glimpse tho se traces  when a CIA no te abo ut Japan’s
newly-fo rmed Cabinet Research Chamber, s crawled in handwriting in Octo ber 1952, reco rds  (in wo rds  that can lo gically o nly refer to
Mainland China) “CRC Japan wo rks  mainland o ps  and is  willing to  wo rk fo r Americans  o n a clandes tine bas is ”.6 9  We see the traces
again when o ne o f China's  mo s t famo us  generals , Tang Enbo , makes  a quiet vis it to  Japan o n behalf o f the Natio nalis t go vernment
in 1957, and is  taken by CRC adviso r Tatsumi Eiichi and his  o ld friend Do i Akio  o n a perso nal to ur o f the Nippei (Japan Peace)
Indus try Co rpo ratio n, fo rmerly kno wn as  the Dai-Nippo n Heiki (Great Japan Armament) Co rpo ratio n, but no w, under its  mo re benign
name, manufacturing such things  as  aircraft engines . Tatsumi, Do i and Tang are believed to  have go ne s traight fro m the facto ry to  a
meeting with Prime Minis ter Yo shida. What dis turbs  the US military autho rities  abo ut this  to ur is  no t the fact that it to o k place, but
the fact that they have been preempted by Tatsumi and Do i: they had been making preparatio ns  to  guide the general ro und the same
facto ry themselves .70
By the mid-1950s , so me o f tho se Japanese who  had vo lunteered fo r service in Taiwan at the height o f the So uthern Expeditio ns
were co ming ho me, bringing their special expertise with them. In 1956, fo r example, a Japanese fo rmer military o fficer, who  had
go ne to  Taiwan as  a "technical adviso r" in 1951, returned to  Japan and pro mptly repo rted to  Tatsumi, seeking emplo yment as  an
adviso r to  the Cabinet Research Chamber. (Vario us  delays  prevented his  emplo yment with this  agency, but ins tead Tatsumi was  able
to  fix him up with a jo b in a private "research co mmittee" run by o ne o f his  military co nnectio ns ).71 Perhaps  there is  even a faint
echo  o f the So uthern Expeditio ns  in the fate that befell Tsuji Masano bu. In April 1961, Tsuji, by then a member o f the Upper Ho use
o f the Japanese parliament, left fo r a to ur o f So utheas t As ia, apparently partly financed by Japan’s  Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs .72
Info rmatio n received fro m the Japanese Embassy in Saigo n sho wed that he had vis ited So uth Vietnam, and then set o ff o n an
attempted clandes tine vis it to  No rth Vietnam.73 He was  never seen again; and, altho ugh his  disappearance received a great deal
mo re publicity than the disappearance o f Itagaki Kō zō  so me eight years  earlier, it remains  jus t as  much a mys tery.
The legacies  o f Japan’s  transwar regime wo uld linger in o ther ways . The repo rt that the CIA co mpiled o n Japanese intelligence
o rganizatio ns  in 1951, fo r example, was  scathing in its  appraisal o f Japan’s  po s twar Maritime Safety Agency, no ting that the Agency
was  “split by a feud between pre-war Navy Academy perso nnel and pre-war Maritime Co mmiss io n perso nnel within its  ranks , and has
the co ns tant pro blem o f bribery o f o fficials  by smuggling rings  and o f subvers io n by Rightis t undergro und gro ups  seeking co ntro l to
co ntend with”.74 But if that was  so , then o ne reaso n fo r the pro blems  surely lay in the illegal but o fficially-spo nso red activities  o f
gro ups  like Unit Z and the Kawabe, Arisue and Watanabe o rganizatio ns , which had been fo s tered by US G2 almo s t fro m the s tart o f
o ccupatio n. The pro blem, o f co urse, went far beyo nd the bo unds  o f Japan’s  Maritime Safety Agency. It is  in the nature o f secret
ins titutio ns  that they are unacco untable to  o uts ide scrutiny; and it is  in the nature o f unacco untable ins titutio ns  that they beco me
fertile so il fo r co rruptio n, bo th mo netary and mo ral. In enco uraging, fo r their o wn perceived security interes ts , the gro wth o f a mass
o f po o rly regulated clandes tine intelligence activities , the US military and intelligence agencies  spawned fo rces  that were to  have an
effect o n Japanese demo cracy fo r decades  to  co me.
Natio nal go vernments  o f co urse engage in secret info rmatio n gathering. As  lo ng as  there are natio n s tates , there will surely also  be
espio nage. There is  no thing s trange abo ut allies  co llabo rating in intelligence gathering, no r (perhaps) in their mutually spying o n
o ne ano ther. But the evidence no w available o n o ccupatio n Japan pro vides  fo o d fo r tho ught as  we co ntemplate the relatio nship
between the secret and the o pen elements  o f fo rmally demo cratic go vernment in the twenty-firs t century. The co rro s ive fo rce o f
espio nage s tems  fro m its  need to  use and to  fo s ter the devio us , the duplicito us , and tho se who  are willing to  break the law in
pursuit o f ideo lo gy o r self-aggrandizement (o r o ften a mixture o f the two ). US intelligence gathering in and via Japan vividly
illus trates  the co nsequences  o f this . It nurtured the likes  o f Willo ughby and Cano n, Arisue and Tatsumi. It handed eco no mic rewards
and po litical influence to  a gro up o f ex-military and intelligence leaders  who  no t o nly escaped being called to  acco unt fo r their
wartime actio ns , but were also  then willing to  interro gate their less  fo rtunate co mpatrio ts  – the o nes  who  had suffered
impriso nment and des titutio n in vario us  parts  o f the lo s t empire fo llo wing Japan’s  defeat – and sell the resulting info rmatio n to
their victo rio us  fo rmer enemy fo r perso nal gain. By us ing these agents , the o ccupatio n intelligence sys tem helped to  entrench their
po s itio n within Japan’s  bo dy po litic.
The Janus-faced nature o f the o ccupatio n o rder thus  helped to  pro duce a s trangely bipo lar so ciety in po s twar Japan. There can be no
ques tio n that demo cratizatio n did have las ting effects . The Japan o f the late twentieth century was  a place where a wide range o f
po litical beliefs  flo urished s ide-by-s ide, and where a remarkably rich array o f grass ro o ts  so cial mo vements  emerged natio nwide.
One small example o f this  array is  the wo rk o f fo rmer Z Unit co o k and whis tleblo wer Yamada Zenjirō , who  has  devo ted the res t o f
his  life to  wo rking o n human rights  is sues , particularly o n the rights  o f peo ple co erced into  co nfess ing to  crimes  that they had no t
co mmitted. But the genuine spaces  o f freedo m which the o ccupatio n perio d helped to  o pen up have always  exis ted alo ngs ide, and
faced challenges  fro m, an extrao rdinarily adamantine and unyielding nucleus  o f s tate po wer, co re parts  o f which trace its  ances try
back to  deals  between US autho rities  and fo rmer wartime leaders  o utlined in these pages .
The Geo rge W. Bush adminis tratio n was  fo nd o f assuring its  public that the po s t-2003 o ccupatio n o f Iraq wo uld be like the
o ccupatio n o f Japan. A reading o f the CIA do cuments  declass ified o ver the co urse o f the pas t decade allo ws  us  to  review that
analo gy in a new light. Japan’s  current prime minis ter Abe Shinzō , meanwhile, has  pro claimed his  des ire to  “escape fro m the po s twar
regime”, that is , fro m o ccupatio n-era demilitarizatio n and o ther po litical refo rm measures .75 The co nservative vis io n o f these
measures  was  succinctly expressed o n the web page o f the Okazaki Research Ins titute, a bo dy chaired by Okazaki Hisahiko , Prime
Minis ter Abe’s  “fo reign po licy brain” and the so n o f po s twar Fo reign Minis ter Okazaki Katsuo  (o ne architect, amo ngs t o ther things ,
o f the US-Japan “to p secret plan fo r the explo itatio n o f repatriates ”).76  The Okazaki Research Ins titute article describes  the allied
o ccupatio n as  having been do minated by left-wing New Dealers  who se “po licy go al – the emasculatio n and des tructio n o f Japan bo th
spiritually and militarily – left the co untry ripe fo r picking under the Co ld War by the Co mmunis t Internatio nal, an o rganizatio n
dedicated to  advancing co mmunism wo rldwide.”77 To  help rescue Japan fro m such a s tate o f emasculatio n, in 2013 Prime Minis ter
Abe launched a public co mmemo ratio n o f “Res to ratio n o f So vereignty Day”, marking the anniversary o f the end o f the o ccupatio n;
and in 2014 he sent a message o f co ndo lence to  a ceremo ny co mmemo rating the Japanese war criminals  who  were executed o r died
in priso n, describing them as  the “Sho wa martyrs  who  gave their lives  fo r the sake o f to day’s  peace and pro sperity, beco ming the
fo undatio n o f the fatherland”.78
But the his to rical reco rds  available to  us  no w cas t a sharp new light o n tho se who  avo ided martyrdo m, and fo rmed ins tead a small
but po tent co re o f Japan’s  transwar regime within the US embrace. Their influence lingers  o n, no t leas t because so  many key figures
in Japan’s  po litics  to day are their spiritual (and in many cases  also  bio lo gical) heirs . The Japanese o ccupatio n is  less  a mo del than a
cautio nary tale fo r US military interventio ns  and attempts  to  demo cratize fo reign co untries  to day; and the challenge that s till faces
Japanese po litics  is  the lo ng and arduo us  task o f escaping fro m the transwar regime.
Part 1 o f this  article is  available here.
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